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A probabilistic framework is developed that gives a unifying perspective on both the classical and quantum
versions of two-player games. We suggest exploiting peculiar joint probabilities involved in Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen EPR experiments to construct a quantum game when the corresponding classical game is obtained
from factorizable joint probabilities. We analyze how nonfactorizability changes Nash equilibria in three
well-known games of prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken. In this framework we find that for the game
of prisoner’s dilemma even nonfactorizable EPR joint probabilities cannot be helpful to escape from the
classical outcome of the game. For a particular version of the chicken game, however, we find that the two
nonfactorizable sets of joint probabilities, which maximally violate the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne sum of
correlations, indeed result in new Nash equilibria.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.76.061122 PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.a
I. INTRODUCTION
The usual approach in the area of quantum games 1–9
consists of analyzing a quantum system maneuvered by par-
ticipating agents, recognized as players, who possess the nec-
essary means for their actions on parts of the system. The
quantum system evolves to its final state, and players’ pay-
offs, or utilities, mathematically expressed as expectation
values of self-adjoint payoff operators, are generated from
quantum measurement 10. Thus the usual constructions of
quantum games involve the concepts of quantum state vec-
tors, entangled states, quantum measurement, expectation
values, trace operation, and density operators, etc. This may
seem normal because as being part of the research field of
quantum computation 11 quantum games are expected to
exploit relevant tools from quantum mechanics. However, in
our experience, this noticeable reliance of the models of
quantum games on the tools of quantum mechanics also suc-
ceeds in keeping many readers away from this interdiscipli-
nary area of research. Ideally, they would like to see genuine
quantum games constructed from elementary probabilistic
concepts, as is the case with many examples in game theory
12. We find this situation as an opportunity to present a
probabilistic approach in which quantum games are con-
structed without referring to the tools of quantum mechanics.
While looking for the possibility of such an approach, it is
encouraging to find that the most unusual character of quan-
tum mechanics can be expressed in terms of probabilities
13 only. For example, Bell’s inequalities 10,14–16 can be
written in terms of constraints on joint probabilities relevant
to pairs of certain random variables. As probabilities are cen-
tral to the usual analyses in game theory, it seems natural to
use the peculiar probabilities, responsible for the violation of
Bell’s inequalities, to construct quantum games. We therefore
suggest the construction of quantum games from the prob-
abilities arising in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen EPR experi-
ments 10,14,16–18 performed to test the violation of Bell’s
inequalities. The most unusual character of the EPR
probabilities—that they may not be factorizable—motivates
us, in this paper, to find how nonfactorizability can be used
to construct quantum games. In other words, we search for
the role of nonfactorizable probabilities in game-theoretic
solution concepts when EPR experiments provide the sets of
nonfactorizable probabilities.
This explicitly probabilistic approach toward quantum
games is expected to be of interest to readers from such areas
as economics 19 and mathematical biology 20, where
game theory finds extensive applications and the tools of
quantum mechanics are found to be rather alien. Second,
because of its exclusively probabilistic content, this approach
promises to provide a unified perspective for both classical
and quantum games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes standard EPR setup and using it to play two-player
games. Section III discusses playing two-player games using
coins and presents two- and four-coin setups to play the well-
known games of prisoner’s dilemma PD, stag hunt SH,
and chicken 12. Section IV describes playing two-player
games using EPR setup. Section V develops a framework in
which factorizable probabilities lead to the classical game
whereas nonfactorizable probabilities result in the quantum
game. Section VI discusses the results and presents a view
for further work.
II. USING THE STANDARD EPR SETUP
TO PLAY TWO-PLAYER GAMES
We use the standard EPR setup 10,18 to play two-player
games. This setup consists of two spatially-separated partici-
pants, known as Alice and Bob, who share two-particle sys-
tems emitted by the same source. We denote Alice’s param-
eter by a, which can be set either at S1 or at S2, and denote
Bob’s parameter by b, which can be set either at S1 or at S2.
In a run, Alice sets her apparatus either at S1 or at S2 and,
in either case, on receiving her particle she makes a measure-
ment, the outcome of which is A, which is either +1 or −1.
In the same run, Bob sets his apparatus either at S1 or at S2
and, in either case, on receiving his particle he makes a mea-
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surement, the outcome of which is B, which can be either
+1 or −1. Alice and Bob record the outcomes of their mea-
surements for many runs as they receive two-particle systems
emitted from the same source.
We denote the probability that Alice obtains the outcome
A= +1 or −1 by PrA ;a and, similarly, we denote the
probability that Bob obtains the outcome B= +1 or −1 by
PrB ;b. Also, we denote the probability that Alice and Bob
obtain the outcomes A and B, respectively, by
PrA ,B ;a ,b. These outcomes result from their choices of
the parameters a and b—i.e., which one of the four pairs
S1 ,S1, S1 ,S2, S2 ,S1, and S2 ,S2 is realized in a run.
According to quantum theory, the outcomes A and B
both are completely random and Alice and Bob can only find
the probabilities of obtaining +1 or −1 as the outcomes of
their measurements. Alice’s and Bob’s parameters a and b
decide these probabilities.
In many runs, Alice can choose between S1 or S2 with
some probability. Similarly, in many runs, Bob can choose
between S1 or S2 with some probability.
Assume that the source emits a total of N two-particle
systems. We denote by NA ;a the number of times Alice
gets the outcome A when she may set her parameter a either
at S1 or at S2. Similarly, we denote by NB ;b the number
of times Bob gets the outcome B when he may set his
parameter b either at S1 or at S2. And we denote by
NA ,B ;a ,b the number of times when Alice gets the out-
come A and Bob gets the outcome B, wherever they may
set their parameters a and b, respectively. When N is large,
the ensemble probabilities are defined as
PrA;a = NA;a/N ,
PrA;b = NB;b/N ,
PrA,B;a,b = NA,B;a,b/N . 1
Now, factorizability states that
PrA,B;a,b = PrA;aPrB;b . 2
Namely, the joint probabilities are arithmetic product of their
respective marginals.
We recognize key features of an EPR setup being that
these relate to a probabilistic system divided into two parts
such that a each observer has access to one part of the
system, b each observer can select between two available
choices, c observers cannot communicate between them-
selves, d observers can make independent selections be-
tween the available choices, e probabilities relevant to each
part of the system are normalized,1 and f probabilities are
sensible quantities.
It is worth mentioning here that the experimental testing
of Bell’s inequality involves four correlation experiments
that correspond to combining S1 with S1, S1 with S2, S2 with
S1, and S2 with S2, respectively. These experiments are mu-
tually exclusive in the sense that for any given experiment
Alice has to select between S1 and S2 and Bob has to select
between S1 and S2. That is, Alice Bob cannot go for S1 S1
and S2 S2 simultaneously because the corresponding ob-
servables are incompatible and cannot be measured simulta-
neously, whereas in the above derivation of the Bell’s in-
equality, it is assumed that S1 ,S1 ,S2 ,S2 all have definite
values which can be measured simultaneously in pairs.
To bring nonfactorizability into the realm of two-player
games, we consider symmetric two-player, two-strategy,
noncooperative games 12 represented by the matrices
A = AliceX1
X2










where all K ,L ,M ,N are real numbers. Players can go for one
of the two available strategies: X1, X2 for Alice and X1, X2
for Bob.
In this paper we construct quantum games from nonfac-
torizable probabilities that exploit the EPR setup. This rests
on Fine’s view 21 that violation of Bell’s inequality in EPR
experiments shows that quantum theory violates factorizabil-
ity. This view allows us to construct quantum games for
which factorizability always corresponds to the classical
game.
III. PLAYING GAMES WITH COINS
The above-mentioned features are remindful of coins
which, if distributed between players, are found to have all
the above-mentioned properties. For coins factorizability has
a straightforward meaning in that the associated probabilities
remain factorizable. Hence, we develop an analysis of two-
player games with nonfactorizable probabilities by first
translating playing of three well-known games in terms of
the games played when players share coins. It turns out that
a version of this translation provides the right comparison
with the probabilities involved in the EPR experiments and
opens the way to the next step—i.e., to introduce nonfactor-
izable probabilities into the playing of two-player games.
A. Two-coin setup
We now consider pairs of coins and use it to play a two-
player game 3. For example, this game can be played when
each player receives a coin, heads up, and “to flip” or “not to
flip” is a player’s strategy. Both coins are then passed to a
referee who rewards the players after observing the state of
both coins.
Assume S1 to flip and S2 not to flip are Alice’s strate-
gies and S1 to flip and S2 not to flip are Bob’s strategies.
That is, with reference to the matrices 3, we make the as-
sociation S1X1, S2X2 and S1X1, S1X1. In a two-coin
setup, we assume that the strategies S1 and S1 represent Al-
ice’s and Bob’s actions “to flip” the coin, respectively and,1Its exact meaning will be described shortly.
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similarly, S2 and S2 represent Alice’s and Bob’s actions “not
to flip” the coin, respectively.
In repeated runs of the game players can play mixed strat-
egies. Alice’s mixed strategy x 0,1 is the probability to
choose S1 over S2, and similarly Bob’s mixed strategy
y 0,1 is the probability to choose S1 over S2. Players’
payoffs are written as
A,Bx,y =  x1 − x 
TK,K L,M
M,L N,N  y1 − y  , 4
where T is for transpose and the subscripts A and B refer to
Alice and Bob, respectively. The first and second entries in
parentheses are Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs, respectively. As-
suming the strategy pair x ,y to be a Nash equilibrium
NE 12 then requires that
Ax,y −Ax,y 0,
Bx,y −Bx,y 0. 5
In the rest of this paper we will use “NE” when we refer to
either a Nash equilibrium or to Nash equilibria, assuming
that the right meaning can be judged from the context. We
identify this arrangement to play a two-player game using
two coins as the two-coin setup.
B. Four-coin setup
The game 3 can also be played using four coins instead
of two. It is arranged by assigning two coins to each player
before the game is played. In a run each player has to choose
one coin. Two coins out of four are, therefore, chosen by the
players in each turn. These coins are then passed to a referee
who tosses them together and observes the outcome. It is
assumed that the players do not need to share fair coins.
We recall that in two-coin setup S1 and S1 are Alice’s and
Bob’s strategies, respectively, which represent players’ ac-
tions “to flip” the coin that a player receives in a turn. Instead
of flipping or not flipping, in four-coin setup a player’s strat-
egy is to choose one out of the two coins that are made
available to each player in a turn. The four-coin setup is
relevant as, in a run, choosing a coin out of the two corre-
sponds to choosing one of the two directions in which mea-
surement is performed in standard EPR experiment, the out-
come of which is +1 or −1.
In repeated games, a player’s strategy is defined by the
selection she makes over several runs of the game. For ex-
ample, a player plays a pure strategy when she goes for the
same coin over all the runs and plays a mixed strategy when
she finds a probability to choose one coin out of the two over
many runs. The referee rewards the players according to their
strategies, the underlying statistics of four coins obtained
from the outcomes of many tosses, each one of which fol-
lows every time the two players choose two out of the total
four coins, and the matrices 3 representing the game being
played.
We identify the arrangement using four coins to play a
two-player game as the four-coin setup. Note that in four-
coin setup the players’ rewards depend on the outcomes of
repeated tosses even for pure strategies. A large number of
runs are, therefore, necessary whether a player plays a pure
strategy or a mixed strategy. The four-coin setup provides an
inherently probabilistic character to playing a two-player
game and facilitates a probabilistic analysis when we seek to
play the game 3 using EPR experiments.
As the four-coin setup uses a different definition of a strat-
egy relative to the two-coin setup, we call S1 and S2 Alice’s
coins and S1 and S2 Bob’s coins. When selecting a coin is a
player’s strategy and we want to play the game given by the
matrices 3, it is reasonable to make the association S1
X1, S2X2 and S1X1, S1X1.
We represent the head of a coin by +1 and its tail by −1
and adapt this convention in the rest of this paper. For coins,
Alice’s outcome of A= +1 or −1 whether she goes for S1 or
S2 is independent from Bob’s outcome of B= +1 or −1
whether he goes for S1 or S2 and relevant joint probabilities
are factorizable.
Referring to the definition 2 of factorizability and notic-
ing that probabilities associated with coins are factorizable,
we use the same notation that is introduced in Sec. II to
consider, for example, the probability PrA ,B ;S1 ,S1,
which can be factorized as PrA ;S1PrB ;S1.
We define the probabilities r ,r 0,1 by r=Pr+1;S1
and r=Pr+1;S1, saying that r is the probability of getting
a heads for Alice’s first coin S1 and r is the probability
of getting a heads for Bob’s first coin S1. Factorizability
then allows us to write Pr+1,−1;S1 ,S1=r1−r and
Pr−1,−1;S2 ,S2= 1−s1−s where s=Pr+1;S2 and s
=Pr+1;S2; i.e., s and s are the probabilities of getting a
heads for Alice’s and Bob’s second coin, respectively.




+ 1 − 1 + 1 − 1
Alice S1
+ 1 rr r1 − r rs r1 − s
− 1 r1 − r 1 − r1 − r s1 − r 1 − r1 − s
+ 1 sr s1 − r ss s1 − s
S2
− 1 r1 − s 1 − s1 − r s1 − s 1 − s1 − s 6
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from which we define payoff relations for the players:
A,BS1,S1 = r¸TA,Br¸, A,BS1,S2 = r¸TA,Bs¸,
A,BS2,S1 = s¸TA,Br¸, A,BS2,S21 = s¸TA,Bs¸,
7
where r¸=  r1−r , s¸= 
s





ample, AS1 ,S2 is Alice’s payoff when, in repeated runs of
coin tossing, she always goes for her first coin, i.e., S1, while
Bob goes for his second coin, i.e., S2.
As is the case with the two-coin setup, Alice’s mixed
strategy in the four-coin setup is the probability with which
she chooses her pure strategy2 S1 over her other pure strategy
S2 during repeated runs of the experiment. Similarly, Bob’s
mixed strategy is the probability with which he chooses his
pure strategy S1 over his other pure strategy S2 during re-
peated runs of the experiment. Assume that Alice plays S1
with probability x and Bob plays S1 with probability y; their
mixed-strategy payoff relations are
A,Bx,y =  x1 − x 
TA,BS1,S1 A,BS1,S2
A,BS2,S1 A,BS2,S2
 y1 − y  .
8
The NE can then be found from 5, which is written as
r¸ − s¸TAyr¸ − s¸ + s¸	x − x 0,
xr¸ − s¸T + s¸T	Br¸ − s¸y − y 0. 9
In the following, before we make a transition to playing our
game using EPR experiments, we consider playing three
well-known games using both the two- and four-coin setups.
C. Examples
We analyze the games of PD, SH, and chicken in two- and
four-coin setups and afterwards make a transition to the EPR
setup. The PD is known to be representative of the problems
of social cooperation 12 and has been one of the earliest 2
and favorite topics for quantum games. Hence it is worth-
while to analyze this game in the setup using nonfactorizable
probabilities. Our second game is SH, which, like PD, de-
scribes conflict between safety and social cooperation. Our
third game is chicken, also known as the hawk-dove game
12, which is considered an influential model of conflict for
two players in game theory.
1. Prisoner’s dilemma
The PD is a noncooperative game 12 that is widely
known to economists and social and political scientists and
in recent years to quantum physicists. It was one of the ear-
liest games to be investigated in the quantum regime 2. Its
name comes from the following situation: two criminals are
arrested after having committed a crime together. Each sus-
pect is placed in a separate cell and may choose between two
strategies: to confess D and not to confess C, where C
and D stand for cooperation and defection.
If neither suspect confesses, i.e., C ,C, they go free,
which is represented by K units of payoff for each suspect.
When one prisoner confesses D and the other does not C,
the prisoner who confesses gets M units of payoff, which
represents freedom as well as financial reward, i.e., MK,
while the prisoner who did not confess gets L, represented by
his ending up in prison. When both prisoners confess, i.e.,
D ,D, both are given a reduced term represented by N units
of payoff, where NL, but it is not so good as going free,
i.e., KN.
Referring to the matrices 3 we make the association X1,
X1C and X2, X2D and require that MKNL. We
define 1= M −K, 2= N−L, and 3= 2−1 which
makes 1, 20 for this game. In two-coin setup, the in-
equalities 5 give
Ax,y −Ax,y = y3 − 2x − x 0,
Bx,y −Bx,y = x3 − 2y − y 0, 10
with the result that the strategy pair x ,y= 0,0 comes
out as a unique NE. At this equilibrium the players’ payoffs
are AS1 ,S1=N=BS1 ,S1.
In the four-coin setup, the PD game as defined above is
played as follows. Using the mixed-strategy payoff relation
8, the pair of pure strategies S2 ,S2 is represented by
x ,y= 0,0. If we require this strategy pair to be a
NE, then we also need to know about the constraints this
requirement imposes on r, s, r, and s. When x ,y
= 0,0 the NE inequalities 9 for PD are reduced to −xs
−r21 /2−1s+1	0 and −ys−r21 /2−1s
+1	0 which require that s−r0 and s−r0 which
should be true both when 1 /21 and when 1 /21.
This, of course, is possible if
PrS2+ 1	 = s = 0 = s = PrS2+ 1	 , 11
which must be fulfilled if the strategy pair x ,y= 0,0 is
to be a NE in PD. Along with this the probabilities
PrA ,B ;a ,b are to be factorizable.
This result provides the basis on which the forthcoming
argument for the quantum version of this game rests. Notice
that, from 7, we obtain AS2 ,S2=BS2 ,S2=N when
Eq. 11 holds.
The constraint 11 appears when the strategy pair S2 ,S2
is assumed to be the NE. One can assume other strategy
pair—for example, S1 ,S1—to be a NE for which, instead of
the requirement 11, we obtain PrS1+1	=r=0=r
=PrS1+1	. However, it is found that this freedom does not
affect the argument for a quantum game developed in this
paper.
2. Stag hunt
Along with PD, the game of SH provides another inter-
esting context to study problems of social cooperation. It
2Notice that our definition of a pure strategy corresponds to the
usual mixed-strategy. This agrees with the result in quantum games
that a product a pure state corresponds to a mixed-strategy classical
game.
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describes the situation when two hunters can either jointly
hunt a stag an adult deer that makes a large meal or indi-
vidually hunt a rabbit which is tasty but makes a substan-
tially small meal. Hunting a stag is quite challenging and
hunters need to cooperate with each other, especially, it is
quite unlikely that a hunter hunts a stag alone.
It is found that, in contrast to PD, which has a single, pure
NE, the game of SH has three NE, two of which are pure and
one is mixed. The two pure NE correspond to the situations
when both hunters hunt the stag as a team and when each
hunts rabbit by himself. The SH differs from PD in that
mutual cooperation gives maximum reward to the hunters.
When compared to PD, SH is considered a better model for
the problems of social cooperation.
Referring to the matrices 3 the game of SH is defined by
KMNL and M +NK+L. In two-coin setup the NE
inequalities for this game are the same as the inequalities
10 except that now we have 320 and 01 instead
of 1, 20, which holds for PD. Here 1, 2, and 3 are
defined in Sec. III C 1. This leads to three NE:
x,y1 = 0,0 ,
x,y2 = 2/3,2/3 ,
x,y3 = 1,1 , 12
and the corresponding payoffs at these equilibria, obtained
from Eqs. 4, are
Ax,y1 = N =Bx,y1,
Ax,y2 = 2/323 + 2/34 + N =Bx,y2,
Ax,y3 = K =Bx,y3,
where we define 4=L+M −2N.
Now consider playing this game within the four-coin
setup in which the NE inequalities 9 reduce to
r − syr − s3 + s3 − 2x − x 0,
r − sxr − s3 + s3 − 2y − y 0. 13
From these inequalities the NE x ,y1= 0,0 results when
s=0=s and, similarly, the NE x ,y3= 1,1 results when
r=0=r. Also, the inequalities 13 hold when x= s3
−2 / s−r3 and y= s3−2 / s−r3, and for
x ,y2= 2 /3 ,2 /3 to be a NE we require
s = 0, r = 1 and s = 0, r = 1. 14
These constraints on r, s, r, and s hold along with the
probabilities PrA ,B ;a ,b being factorizable.
3. Chicken game
The game of chicken is about two drivers who drive to-
ward each other from opposite directions. One driver must
turn aside, or both may die in a crash. If one driver turns
aside but the other does not, he will be called a “chicken.”
While each driver prefers not to yield to the opponent, the
outcome where neither driver yields is the worst possible one
for both. In this anticoordination game it is mutually benefi-
cial for parties to play different strategies.
Sometimes, chicken is also known as the “hawk-dove”
game, which originates from the parallel development of the
basic principles of this game in two different research areas:
economics and mathematical biology. Economists, and po-
litical scientists too, refer 19 to this game as chicken, while
mathematical biologists refer 20 to it as the hawk-dove
game.
The game of chicken differs from PD in that in chicken
the mutual defection the crash when both players drive
straight is the most feared outcome, while in PD coopera-
tion while the other player defects is the worst outcome.
A version of the chicken game is obtained from the ma-
trices 3 when
K = 0, L = 	, M = 
 ,
N = 0, 0 	 	 + 
 . 15




−y0 and three NE emerge:
x,y1 = 1,0 ,
x,y2 = „	/	 + 
,	/	 + 
… ,
x,y3 = 0,1 . 16
The corresponding payoffs at these equilibria, obtained from




=Bx ,y2, Ax ,y3=
, and Bx ,y3
=	. Now we play this game using the four-coin setup. The
NE inequalities come out to be the same as the ones given in
13 except that now we have 3=−	+
 and 2=−	.
Then for x ,y1= 1,0 we require r=0 and s=0. Simi-
larly, for x ,y3= 0,1 we require r=0 and s=0.
At x ,y2= (	 / 	+
 ,	 / 	+






−y0 which puts constraint on r,
s, r, and s given as
	1 − r = 
s, 	1 − r = 
s . 17
A special case is the one when 	=
 and the strategy pair
x ,y= 1 /2,1 /2 becomes a NE which imposes certain
constraints on r, s, r, and s. For this NE the inequalities 9,
for the game defined by 3 and 15, are reduced to
r−s−	+
r+s /2+L	1 /2−x0 and r−s−	
+
r+s /2+L	1 /2−y0. This requires r+s=1=r+s if
the strategy pair x ,y= 1 /2,1 /2 is to be a NE in this
game. Along with this, the probabilities PrA ,B ;a ,b are
to be factorizable.
IV. PLAYING GAMES WITH EPR EXPERIMNTS
Section III B describes playing a two-player game with
four coins such that choosing a coin is a strategy while play-
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ers’ payoffs are given by their strategies, the matrix of the
game, and the underlying statistics of the coins. This facili-
tates transition to playing the same game using EPR experi-
ments.
In the EPR setup, Alice and Bob are spatially separated
and are unable to communicate with each other. In an indi-
vidual run, both receive one-half of a pair of particles origi-
nating from a common source. In the same run of the experi-
ment both choose one from two given pure strategies.
These strategies are the two directions in space along which
spin or polarization measurements can be made.
Keeping the notation for the coins, we denote these direc-
tions to be S1, S2 for Alice and S1, S2 for Bob. Each mea-
surement generates +1 or −1 as the outcome, as is the case
with coins after their toss in the four-coin setup. Experimen-
tal results are recorded for a large number of individual runs
of the experiment, and payoffs are awarded depending on the
directions the players go for over many runs defining their
strategies, the matrix of the game they play, and the statis-
tics of the measurement outcomes.
For EPR experiments, we retain Cereceda’s notation 22
for the associated probabilities:
pk = PrA,B;a,b , 18
with






+ 4b − 1 + 8a − 1 .
In this notation, for example, we write p1 for the probabil-
ity Pr+1, +1;S1 ,S1 and p8 for the probability Pr−1,




+ 1 − 1 + 1 − 1
+ 1 p1 p2 p5 p6
Alice
S1
− 1 p3 p4 p7 p8
+ 1 p9 p10 p13 p14
S2
− 1 p11 p12 p15 p16 19
This table allows us to transparently see how the probabili-
ties pi1 i16 are linked to the probabilities
PrA ,B ;a ,b, where we recall that a can be set at S1 or at
S2 and, similarly, b can be set at S2 or at S2. In Cereceda’s
notation the EPR probabilities pi are normalized as they sat-
isfy the following relations:
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, p5 + p6 + p7 + p8 = 1,
p9 + p10 + p11 + p12 = 1, p13 + p14 + p15 + p16 = 1.
20
Notice that the factorizable probabilities 6 are also normal-
ized and 20 holds for them.
Payoff relations 7 are originally constructed when the
game given by the matrices 3 is played with four coins and
their mathematical form convinces one to use the following
recipe 23,24 to reward players when the same game is
played using EPR probabilities 19:
AS1,S1 = Kp1 + Lp2 + Mp3 + Np4,
AS1,S2 = Kp5 + Lp6 + Mp7 + Np8,
AS2,S1 = Kp9 + Lp10 + Mp11 + Np12,
AS2,S2
1 = Kp13 + Lp14 + Mp15 + Np16. 21
Here AS1 ,S2, for example, is Alice’s payoff when she
plays S1 and Bob plays S2. As is the case with four coins, the
payoff relations for Bob are obtained from 21 by the trans-
formation LM in Eqs. 21.
When pi are factorizable in terms of r ,r ,s ,s, a compari-
son of 21 with 7 requires
p1 = rr, p2 = r1 − r, p3 = r1 − r ,
p4 = 1 − r1 − r ,
p5 = rs, p6 = r1 − s, p7 = s1 − r ,
p8 = 1 − r1 − s ,
p9 = sr, p10 = s1 − r, p11 = r1 − s ,
p12 = 1 − s1 − r ,
p13 = ss, p14 = s1 − s, p15 = s1 − s ,
p16 = 1 − s1 − s . 22
That is, the factorizability of pi in terms r, r, s, and s makes
the game played by EPR probabilities equivalent to the one
played by using coins.
However, the EPR probabilities pi, appearing in 7, may
not be factorizable in terms of r, s, r, and s, whereas for
both the payoff relations 7 and 21 the normalization 20
continues to hold.
V. TWO-PLAYER GAMES USING NONFACTORIZABLE
PROBABILITIES
As is the case with the coin game, Alice’s mixed strategy
is defined to be the probability to choose between S1 and S2
and we can use, once again, the payoff relations 8, which,
however, now correspond to the possible situation when pi
may not be factorizable So that relations 7 can be replaced
with relations 21 in Alice’s mixed-strategy payoff relation
in 8. The same applies to Bob’s payoff relations.
Note that when pi are factorizable, using 22 allows the
probabilities r ,r ,s ,s to be expressed in terms of pi:
r = p1 + p2, s = p9 + p10,
r = p1 + p3, s = p5 + p7, 23
which are useful relations for the forthcoming argument for a
quantum game.
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Along with the normalization 20, the EPR probabilities
pi 1 i16 also satisfy certain other constraints imposed
by the requirements of causality. Cereceda 22 writes these
constraints as
p1 + p2 − p5 − p6 = 0, p1 + p3 − p9 − p11 = 0,
p9 + p10 − p13 − p14 = 0, p5 + p7 − p13 − p15 = 0,
p3 + p4 − p7 − p8 = 0, p11 + p12 − p15 − p16 = 0,
p2 + p4 − p10 − p12 = 0, p6 + p8 − p14 − p16 = 0, 24
which is referred to as the causal communication constraint
22. Notice that the constraints 24, of course, also hold
when pi are factorizable and are written in terms of r, s, r,
and s as in 22. Essentially, these constraints state that, on
measurement, Alice’s probability of obtaining particular out-
come +1 or −1, when she goes for S1 or S2, is independent
of how Bob sets up his apparatus i.e., along S1 or along S2.
The same applies to Bo—i.e., on measurement his probabil-
ity of obtaining a particular outcome +1 or −1 when he
goes for S1 or S2—is independent of how Alice sets up her
apparatus i.e., along S1 or along S2. Other authors may like
to call the constraints 24 by some different name; for ex-
ample, Winsberg and Fine 25 have described them as the
locality constraint.
Notice that because of normalization 20 half of Eqs.
24 are redundant, which makes 8 among 16 probabilities pi
independent. A convenient solution 22 of the system 20
and 24, for which the set of variables
 = p2,p3,p6,p7,p10,p11,p13,p16	 25
is expressed in terms of the remaining set of variables
 = p1,p4,p5,p8,p9,p12,p14,p15	 , 26
is given as follows:
p2 = 1 − p1 − p4 + p5 − p8 − p9 + p12 + p14 − p15/2,
p3 = 1 − p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 + p15/2,
p6 = 1 + p1 − p4 − p5 − p8 − p9 + p12 + p14 − p15/2,
p7 = 1 − p1 + p4 − p5 − p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 + p15/2,
p10 = 1 − p1 + p4 + p5 − p8 − p9 − p12 + p14 − p15/2,
p11 = 1 + p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 − p9 − p12 − p14 + p15/2,
p13 = 1 − p1 + p4 + p5 − p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 − p15/2,
p16 = 1 + p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 − p9 + p12 − p14 − p15/2.
27
The relationships 27 between joint probabilities arise be-
cause both the normalization condition 20 and the causal
communication constraint 24 are fulfilled.
From Eqs. 27 one can obtain other constraints consider-
ing that the sum of any combination of probabilities from the
set  must be non-negative. In the following are some results
to be used later in this paper. In 27 the sum p2+ p7 is non-
negative and it requires that p1+ p81. In 27 the sum p3
+ p10 is non-negative and it requires that p1+ p121. These
inequalities are found useful when we develop a quantum
version of PD. Similarly, the sum p6+ p13 is non-negative and
it requires that p8+ p131. This inequality is found useful in
developing a quantum version of SH.
Using 21 in 8, with the assumption that x ,y is a
NE, one obtains
Ax,y −Ax,y = x − xyK1 + L2 + M3
+ N4	 + Kp5 − p13 + Lp6 − p14
+ Mp7 − p15 + Np8 − p16	 0,
28
Bx,y −Bx,y = y − yxK1 + M2 + L3
+ N4	 + Kp9 − p13 + Mp10
− p14 + Lp11 − p15 + Np12 − p16	
 0, 29
where 1= p1− p5− p9+ p13, 2= p2− p6− p10+ p14, 3= p3
− p7− p11+ p15, and 4= p4− p8− p12+ p16.
Now use 27 to write 28 and 29 in terms of the prob-
abilities appearing in the set  given in 26 to obtain
Ax,y −Ax,y = 1/2x − xy31 + p1 + p4 − p5
− p8 − p9 − p12 − p14 − p15 − 31
− p5 − p8 − p14 − p15 + 1 + 2p1
− p4 − p9 + p12	 0, 30
Bx,y −Bx,y = 1/2y − yx3 1 + p1 + p4
− p5 − p8 − p9 − p12 − p14 − p15
− 31 − p9 − p12 − p14 − p15 + 1
+ 2p1 − p4 − p5 + p8	 0. 31
Notice that the probabilities associated with the EPR experi-
ments can be factorized only for certain directions of mea-
surements even for singlet states. For these directions the
game played using EPR experiments can thus be interpreted
within the four-coin setup.
Essentially, we obtain a quantum game from the classical
as follows. Referring to the four-coin setup developed in the
Sec. III B, the factorizability of associated probabilities in
terms of r, s, r, and s allows us to translate the requirement
that the resulting game have a classical interpretation into
certain constraints on r, s, r, and s. We find that from
factorizability the relations 23 follow and from these rela-
tions the constraints on r, s, r, and s can be reexpressed in
terms of pi 1 i16. We now obtain a quantum version of
the game by retaining these constraints and afterwards allow-
ing pi to become nonfactorizable. In this procedure retaining
the constraints ensures that a classical outcome results when
the probabilities become factorizable.
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In the following we consider the impact of nonfactoriz-
able probabilities on the NE in PD, SH, and chicken game.
A. Prisoner’s dilemma
Recall that Sec. III A states the result that when PD is
played with four coins we require the condition 11 to hold
if the strategy pair S2 ,S2 is to exist as a NE. Along with this
the probabilities pi are to be factorizable.
This motivates us to construct a quantum version of PD
when probabilities pi are not factorizable while the constraint
11 remains valid. The condition 11 ensures that with fac-
torizable probabilities the game can be interpreted classi-
cally.
Notice that when the probabilities pi are factorizable—
i.e., they can be written as in 22—the constraint 11 can
hold when numerical values are assigned to certain prob-
abilities among pi:
p5 = 0, p7 = 0, p9 = 0, p10 = 0, p16 = 1, 32
where, because of the normalization 20, p16=1 requires
that p13=0, p14=0, and p15=0. This can also be noticed more
directly from 23. This assignment of values to certain prob-
abilities reduces Eqs. 20 and 24 to
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, p1 + p2 = p6, p1 + p3 = p11,
p3 + p4 = p8, p11 + p12 = 1, p2 + p4 = p12, p6 + p8 = 1.
33
Substituting 32 into 30 and 31 gives
Ax,y −Ax,y = 1/2x − xy31 + p1 + p4 − p8
− p12 − 31 − p8 + 1 + 2p1
− p4 + p12	 0, 34
Bx,y −Bx,y = 1/2y − yx31 + p1 + p4 − p8
− p12 − 31 − p12 + 1 + 2p1
− p4 + p8	 0. 35
Note that from 33 we obtain 1− p8= p6= p1+ p2, which,
for factorizable probabilities, becomes equal to r when we
refer to Eqs. 23. Similarly, from 33 we obtain p1− p4
+ p12= p1+ p2=r. Substituting these into 34 along with the
condition x=0=y gives A0,0−Ax ,0=xr20. In a
similar way we find from 33 that 1− p12= p11= p1+ p3
which for factorizable probabilities becomes equal to r
when we use Eqs. 23. Likewise, from 33 we obtain p1
− p4+ p8= p1+ p3=r. Substituting these into 35, along with
the condition x=0=y, gives B0,0−B0,y=yr2
0. This can be described as follows: When probabilities p1,
p4, p8, and p12 are factorizable and the values assigned to
them in 32 hold, the inequalities 34 and 35 ensure that
the strategy pair S2 ,S2 becomes a NE.
Now we ask about the fate of the NE strategy pair S2 ,S2
when in 32 the values assigned to certain probabilities, re-
sulting from the requirement 11, hold while pi do not re-
main factorizable in terms of r, s, r, and s. Allow the prob-
abilities p1, p4, p8, and p12 not to be factorizable and use 32
in 27 to get 1− p1+ p4− p8− p12=0 and the inequalities 34
and 35 take the form
Ax,y −Ax,y = x − x2y − 1 − p8/p1	
− 1yp1 0, 36
Bx,y −Bx,y = y − y2x − 1 − p12/p1	
− 1x
p1 0, 37
where 1 and 2 are defined in the Sec. III C 1. Note that as
p1+ p81 and p1+ p121 we have 1 1− p8 / p1 and
1 1− p12 / p1 so that
y − 1 − p8/p1	 0, x − 1 − p12/p1	 0, 38
which results, once again, in the strategy pair x ,y
= 0,0 being a NE, which is the classical outcome of the
game.
Notice that this NE emerges for nonfactorizable EPR
probabilities along with our requirement that factorizable
probabilities must lead to the classical game. This result for
PD appears to diverge away from the reported results in
quantum games 2. We believe that part of the reason re-
sides with how payoff relations and players’ strategies are
defined in the present framework, which exploits the EPR
setup for playing a quantum game.
B. Stag hunt
Section III C 2 describes playing SH in the four-coin
setup for which three NE emerge. For each of these three NE
there correspond constraints on r, s, r, and s for factoriz-
able probabilities. In the following we first translate these
constraints in terms of the EPR probabilities pi and after-
wards allow pi to assume nonfactorizable values when the
constraints on r, s, r, and s, expressed in terms of pi, con-
tinue to hold. In the following we follow this procedure for
each individual NE that arises when SH is played in the
four-coin setup.
x ,y1= 0,0. Refer to 12 in Sec. III C 2 and consider
the NE x ,y1= 0,0 for which the constraint on probabili-
ties are 11 as is the case with PD. The analysis for the
quantum PD from Sec. V A, therefore, remains valid and we
can directly use the inequalities 36–38 to obtain
Ax,y −Ax,y = x − xy3 − 21 − p8/p1	p1
 0,
Bx,y −Bx,y = y − yx3 − 21 − p12/p1	p1
 0, 39
where 320. This gives rise to three equilibria
x,y1
Qa = 0,0 ,
x,y2
Qa = 2/31 − p12/p1, 2/31 − p8/p1	 ,
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x,y3
Qa = 1,1 , 40
where the superscript Q refers to “quantum.” From the rela-
tions 39 and 40 and the inequalities p1+ p81 and
p1+ p121 it turns out that x ,y1
Qa emerges without any
further constraints apart from the ones given by the reex-




nonfactorizable probabilities are such that, apart from 32 to
hold, both 2 /31− p12 / p1 and 2 /31− p8 / p1 have
values in the interval 0, 1; and x ,y3
Qa emerges when,
apart from 32 being true, both 3−21− p8 / p1	 and
3−21− p12 / p1	 are non negative.
x ,y2= 2 /3 ,2 /3. Refer to Sec. III C 2 and use
23 and 24, along with the normalization 20, to express
the constraints 14 as
p1 = 1 = p6 and p11 = 1 = p16. 41
The normalization 20, then, assigns zero value to the re-
maining 12 probabilities. Now substitute the constraints
41 in Eqs. 30 and 31 to obtain the NE inequalities
that will correspond to the nonfactorizable probabilities:
Ax ,y−Ax ,y= x−xy3−20 and Bx ,y
−Bx ,y= y−yx3−20. This result is identical
to the classical situation and the three NE x ,y1
Qb = 0,0,
x ,y2
Qb = 2 /3 ,2 /3, and x ,y3
Qb = 1,1 and
emerges when 41 hold.
x ,y3= 1,1. For this NE in 12 the constraint on the
probabilities is r=0=r. For factorizable probabilities, this
constraint can be rewritten using normalization 20 along
with 23 and 24 as
p5 = 0, p6 = 0, p9 = 0, p11 = 0,
p7 + p8 = 1 = p10 + p12, p4 = 1, 42
from which using the normalization 20 it then follows that
p1=0, p2=0, and p3=0. The constraints 42 reduce the Nash
inequalities 30 and 31 to
Ax,y −Ax,y = 1/2x − xy32 − p8 − p12 − p14
− p15 − 31 − p8 − p14 − p15 + 1
+ 2− 1 + p12	 0, 43
Bx,y −Bx,y = 1/2y − yx32 − p8 − p12 − p14
− p15 − 31 − p12 − p14 − p15
+ 1 + 2− 1 + p8	 0. 44
Using the constraints 42 in the seventh equation in 27
results in p13= 2− p8− p12− p14− p15 /2, which then simpli-
fies the Nash inequalities 43 and 44 to
Ax,y −Ax,y = x − x− 1 − yp133 + 1
− p122	 0,
Bx,y −Bx,y = y − y− 1 − xp133 + 1 − p8
− p132	 0, 45
and gives rise to three NE that are described below.
x ,y1
Qc
. For this NE we have x ,y1
Qc = 0,0 and the
inequalities 45 become
A0,0 −Ax,0 = xp1331 − 2/31 − p12/p13	 0,
B0,0 −B0,y = yp1331 − 2/31 − p8 − p13/p13	
 0. 46
As p1+ p120 and p8+ p130 we have 1− p120 and
1− p8− p130. That is, x ,y1
Qc = 0,0 will be a NE when
p8, p12, and p13 are such that 1 2 /31− p12 / p13 and




. From the inequalities 45 the strategy pair
x ,y2
Qc = x ,y where the strategy pair x=1− 2 /31
− p8− p13 / p13 and y=1− 2 /31− p12 / p13 can exist as a
NE when p8, p12, and p13 are such that x ,y 0,1. To-
gether with this the constraints 42 hold.
x ,y3
Qc
. For the possible NE x ,y3
Qc = 1,1 the in-
equalities 45 become
Ax,y −Ax,y = 1 − x1 − p122 0,
Bx,y −Bx,y = 1 − y1 − p8 − p132 0,
47
which are to hold along with that the constraints 42 being
true. Using 1 ,10 with p1+ p120 and p8+ p130
we find that the inequalities 47 will always hold and the
only requirement for the strategy pair x ,y3
Qc = 1,1 to be
a NE is that the constraints 42 hold.
So the list of possible NE that can arise in the quantum
SH consists of five members: i.e., 0, 0, 1, 1, 21
− p12 /3p1 , 21− p8 /3p1	, 2 /3 , 2 /3, and 1
−21− p8− p13 /3p13	, 1−21− p12 /3p13	. Which
one, or more, from this list is going to arise depends on the
set of nonfactorizable probabilities. For example, we notice
that there exist 22 two sets of nonfactorizable probabilities
that maximally violate the quantum prediction of the
Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne CHSH 26 sum of correla-
tions. The first set is
pj = 2 + 
2/8 for all pj  ,
pk = 2 − 
2/8 for all pk  , 48
and the second set is
pj = 2 − 
2/8 for all pj  ,
pk = 2 + 
2/8 for all pk  , 49
where  and  are defined in 25 and 26, respectively. The
probabilities in these sets are nonfactorizable because for
both sets a solution of Eqs. 22 will involve one or more of
the probabilities r, s, r, and s being negative or greater than
1. Now for SH the requirement that factorizable probabilities
are to lead to a classical game gives rise to three sets of
constraints on EPR probabilities given by 32, 41, and
42. These sets of constraints correspond to the NE
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x ,y1= 0,0, x ,y2= 2 /3 ,2 /3, and x ,y3
= 1,1 respectively. Unfortunately, the probabilities from ei-
ther of the two sets 48 and 49, which maximally violate
the quantum prediction of the CHSH sum of correlations, do
not satisfy these constraints. Stated otherwise, the probabili-
ties from the sets 48 and 49 are in conflict with the re-
quirement that factorizable probabilities must lead to the
classical game of SH. However, other sets of nonfactorizable
probabilities can be found that are consistent with this re-
quirement and, depending on the elements of a set, one or
more out of five possible NE may emerge. This situation can
be described by saying that in SH nonfactorizability can lead
to NE, but unfortunately, either set 48 or 49 cannot be
used for this purpose.
C. Chicken game
Refer to Sec. III C 3 and use Eqs. 17 to express the
constraints on r, s, r, and s in this setup. These constraints
are imposed for the strategy pair x=	 / 	+
=y, which is
to be a NE. Use Eqs. 23 and the normalization 20 to
translate these constraints in terms of the EPR probabilities
pi: 	p2+ p4=
p5+ p7 and 	p3+ p4=
p9+ p10. Adding
and subtracting the second equation from the first one gives
	p2+ p3+2p4=
p5+ p7+ p9+ p10 and 	p2− p3=
p5
+ p7− p9− p10 which can be reexpressed, using Eqs. 27, in
terms of the probabilities in set , defined in 26, to obtain
	 /
−11− p1+ p4= p5− p8+ p9− p12 and 1+
 /	−p14
+ p15= p5− p8− p9+ p12. Using these equations two probabili-
ties can be eliminated from the inequalities 30 and 31. We
select arbitrarily these to be p12 and p15 and express them
in terms of other probabilities in the set , i.e.,
p12 = p5 − p8 + p9 − 	/
 − 11 − p1 + p4 ,
p15 = p14 +
2p5 − p8 − 	/




Notice that for the chicken game, defined in 15, the defini-
tion of 1,2 in Sec. III C 1 gives 1=
 and 2=−	. Now
eliminate p12 and p15 from the inequalities 30 and 31
using Eqs. 50 and substitute for 1,2. The inequalities 30
and 31 then read
Ax,y −Ax,y = 	x − x− yp1 − 2p5 − p9 − p14
+ p8 + 1 − p1 + p4	/
 + p1 − p5
− p9 − p14
/		 + 1 − p5 − p14
− p5 + p14
/		 , 51
Bx,y −Bx,y = 	y − y− xp1 − 2p5 − p9 − p14
+ p8 + 1 − p1 + p4	/
 + p1 − p5
− p9 − p14
/		 + p1 − p4 − 2p5
+ 2p8 − p9 − p14 + 1 − p1 + p4	/

− p9 + p14
/		 . 52
The inequalities 51 and 52 ensure that for factorizable
probabilities the classical NE x=	 / 	+
=y comes out as
the outcome of the game. What is the fate of this equilibrium
when probabilities are not factorizable? To address this ques-
tion we consider a special case when 	=
, for which x
=1 /2=y is the classical mixed-strategy outcome of the
game. To obtain this outcome within the four-coin setup the
constraints on r, s, r, and s are r+s=1=r+s. The in-
equalities 51 and 52 reduce to
Ax,y −Ax,y = 	x − x− y1 + p1 + p4 − 3p5 + p8
− 2p9 − 2p14 + 1 − 2p5 − 2p14	 ,
53
Bx,y −Bx,y = 	y − y− x1 + p1 + p4 − 3p5 + p8
− 2p9 − 2p14 + 1 − 2p5 + 2p8 − 2p9
− 2p14	 . 54
Notice that the inequalities 45 do not allow either of the
strategy pairs x ,y= 1,0 or x ,y= 0,1 to be NE.
Like it has been the case with the quantum SH, we now ask
which of these nine possible NE will emerge when probabili-
ties become nonfactorizable. To answer this we refer to the
set 48 of probabilities and assign the value 2+
2 /8 to
each of the probabilities p1, p4, p5, and p8, p9, p14. Using
Eqs. 50 the assumption that 	=
 then also assigns the
same value, i.e., 2+
2 /8, to both p12 and p15. The inequali-
ties 53 and 54 are
Ax,y −Ax,y = 	/
2x − xy − 1 0,
Bx,y −Bx,y = 	/
2y − yx − 1 0,
55
with the result that the strategy pairs x ,y= 1,1 , 0,0
emerge as the new equilibria,3 so that, in this case, the set
48 of nonfactorizable probabilities indeed leads to the new
equilibria of the game. Using 8 one finds that at the equi-
librium 1, 1 both players get 	2−
2 /4 while at 0,0 both
players get 	2+
2 /4 as their payoffs.
Note that, when reexpressed in terms of the EPR prob-
abilities pi using Eqs. 23, the constraints r+s=1=r+s
can be written as
p1 + p2 + p9 + p10 = 1 = p1 + p3 + p5 + p7, 56
which, of course, continue to hold for the set 48 when the
probabilities pi are allowed to be nonfactorizable.
Similarly, referring to the second set 49, we assign the
value 2−
2 /8 to the probabilities p1, p4, p5, p8, p9, and p14
that appear in 53 and 54. Equations 50, with the as-
sumption that 	=
, then assign the value of 2−
2 /8 to
3Referring to 16 we recall that when 	=
 there are three equi-
libria, i.e., 1,0, 0,1, and 1/2, 1/2, in the classical chicken game,
at which they get rewarded by 	 ,
 , 





), respectively. Here the first and second entries re-
fer to Alice’s and Bob’s rewards, respectively.
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both p12 and p15 and the inequalities 53 and 54 read
Ax,y −Ax,y = − 	/
2x − xy − 1 0,
Bx,y −Bx,y = − 	/
2y − yx − 1 0,
57
which are the same as the ones given in 55, apart from
extra negative signs. This results in three strategy pairs
x ,y= 1,1 , 1,0 , 0,1 to come out as the equilibria.
Once again, using 8 one finds that at all of these three
equilibria both players get equally rewarded by the amount
	2+
2 /4. Hence, while referring to 16, we find that in
this special case when 	=
 the set 49 of probabilities leads
to new equilibria of the game. Notice that, as is the case with
the set 48 of probabilities, the constraints 56 continue to
hold also for the set 49 when pi are allowed to be nonfac-
torizable.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the typical quantization procedure 2,5 of a two-player
game, two quantum bits qubits are in a quantum-correlated
entangled state and are given to the players Alice and Bob.
The players’ strategies consist of performing unitary actions
on their respective qubits. The classical game remains a sub-
set of the quantum game in that both players can play quan-
tum strategies that correspond to the strategies available clas-
sically.
As more choices are allowed to the players, which now
also include superpositions of their classical moves, it gives
ground to the argument4 that van Enk and Pike 27 have put
forward. The setup proposed in this paper uses EPR experi-
ments to play a two-player game and a quantum game is
associated with a classical game such that it becomes hard to
construct an Enk-Pike-type argument as both the payoff re-
lations and the players’ sets of strategies remain identical
28 in the classical and associated quantum games.
In the present setup it is nonfactorizability—responsible
for the violation of Bell’s inequality in EPR experiments—
that gives rise to the new solutions in quantum games. When
players play a game using a physical system for which joint
probabilities are factorizable, the classical game always re-
sults. In other words, the role of nonfactorizable probabilities
is sought in the game-theoretic solution concept of a NE,
when the physical realization for these probabilities is pro-
vided by the EPR experiments. This analysis introduces a
viewpoint in the area of quantum games in which nonfactor-
izability gets translated into the language of game theory.
The argument put forward in this paper can be described
as follows. First, players’ payoffs are reexpressed in the form
A,Bpi ,x ,y ,A ,B where pi are the 16 joint probabilities;
x ,y are players’ strategies, and A ,B are players’ payoff ma-
trices defined in 3. Second, Nash inequalities are used to
impose constraints on pi that ensure that with factorizable pi
the game has a classical outcome and the resulting payoffs
can be interpreted in terms of a classical mixed-strategy
game. It is achieved by playing the game in the four-coin
setup and using Nash inequalities to obtain constraints on the
coin probabilities r, s, r, and s which reproduce the out-
come of the classical mixed-strategy game. Using 23,
which results from factorizability, these constraints on r, s,
r, and s are then translated in terms of constraints on pi.
Third, while referring to the EPR setup, pi are allowed to be
nonfactorizable when the constraints on pi continue to hold.
Fourth, and last, it is observed how nonfactorizability leads
to the emergence of new solutions of the game.
Note that for a game different sets of constraints are de-
fined depending on which NE is to be the solution of the
game. For example, for three NE in chicken we require three
different sets of constraints on r, s, r, and s. Considering
one of these three sets at a time, we repeat the four steps
stated above. The same procedure is then repeated for other
sets of constraints corresponding to other NE.
That is, in this setup not all solutions of a game are reex-
pressed in terms of a single set of constraints on r, s, r, and
s. Instead, a separate set of constraints is found for each NE.
It seems that the four-coin setup is the minimal arrangement
that allows one to introduce, in a smooth way, the EPR prob-
abilities into a gamelike setting. We suggest that with in-
creasing the number of coins, shared by each of the two
players, all the NE of a game can be translated to a single
constraint on the underlying coin probabilities which are
subsequently translated in terms of pi. This will then allow
one to see the role of nonfactorizability in solution of a game
from a single set of constraints. However, this will be ob-
tained at a price: First, more coins will be involved, resulting
in more mathematical complexity; second, for more coins,
the player’s strategy will need to be redefined such that it
permits the incorporation of EPR probabilities.
Note that the usual approach uses entangled states to con-
struct quantum games and this paper uses nonfactorizability
to the same end. Mathematically, nonfactorizability comes
out to be a stronger condition than the condition that trans-
lates entanglement into constraints on joint probabilities.
That is, a nonfactorizable set of probabilities always corre-
sponds to some entangled state, but an entangled state can
produce a factorizable set of probabilities. For example, in
the case of a singlet state the outcomes of two measurements
violate Bell’s inequality only along certain directions, and
not along other directions. In other words, in a quantum
game exploiting entangled states, the joint probabilities may
still be factorizable, but for a quantum game, resulting from
nonfactorizable probabilities, Bell’s inequality is bound to be
violated. Nonfactorizability being a stronger condition may
well be suggested as the reason why it cannot be helpful to
escape from the classical outcome in PD.
The proposed setup demonstrates how nonfactorizability
can change the outcome of a game. We suggest an extension
29 of this setup to analyze multiplayer quantum games 3
where players share physical systems for which joint prob-
abilities cannot be factorized.
4The argument of Enk and Pike 27 can be described as follows.
The extended set of players’ moves allows us to construct an ex-
tended payoff matrix that includes extra available moves. Enk and
Pike interpret this by saying that the “essence” of a quantized game
can be captured by a different classical game and it is the new game
that is constructed and solved and not the original classical game.
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